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Yanofsky’s book explores the limitations of empirical science, mathematics,
logic, and philosophy. Yanofsky’s goal is to discuss paradigmatic examples in
some depth, not to provide the reader with a mere compendium of curiosities.
A wealth of cases is grouped into eight substantive chapters, bound together by
an introductory chapter with an outline of coming attractions, and a synthesis
in the final chapter. The chapters are intended to be largely self-contained, and
each chapter closes with suggestions for further reading. The book is written for
a wide audience; Yanofsky attaches great importance to a clear and accessible
presentation, and most formulas are omitted.
In the introductory chapter 1, Yanofsky characterizes his enterprise in gen-
eral terms and discusses the different themes of the book. A special emphasis
is on the notion of paradox: an argument based on (seemingly) reasonable
premisses and leading to a contradiction or falsehood. Further themes are re-
ductions – a technique to establish connections between impossibility results –,
the language dependence of contradictions, and the notion of reason.
While Yanofsky’s exposition is clear, the thematic arrangement did not strike
me as particularly instructive; I would have preferred a more traditional synop-
sis. However, there is usually an overview at the beginning of each chapter.
Chapter 2 is an exposition of “Language Paradoxes”. Yanofsky first discusses
the liar paradox, and various solutions. Yanofsky’s preferred solution is to accept
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that the liar sentence is contradictory, as it is a product of the human mind.
He then discusses several self-referential paradoxes, such as the barber paradox,
Grelling’s paradox and Russell’s paradox. Yablo’s paradox presents an exception
to the view that all paradoxes of language are self-referential.
The presentation of the individual paradoxes in this chapter is successful, and
Yanofsky’s goal of providing the reader with a gentle introduction is laudable,
but the original context of some of the paradoxes is lost. For example, Russell’s
paradox has its origin in set theory, and I found it to be out of place in the
context of paradoxes of natural language.
Chapter 3 present a variety of “Philosophical Conundrums”, limitations of our
knowledge discovered by philosophers rather than scientists. Yanofsky discusses
the ship of Theseus, problems of (personal) identity, the acquisition of (abstract)
concepts, realism and nominalism concerning abstract and concrete objects,
Zeno’s paradoxes of motion, time travel, paradoxes of vagueness, the Monty
Hall problem, and others.
This chapter will not satisfy the more philosophically-minded reader. Yanof-
sky defends a position he dubs “extreme nominalism”, an antirealism concerning
abstract and concrete objects, of both everyday experience and physics, and
finds that “[w]hat do exist are physical stimuli” (p. 40). However, if there are
stimuli – what are they so reliably caused by? The best explanation, it seems
to me, is that they are caused by objects.
Chapter 4, about “Infinity Puzzles”, is a whirlwind tour of set theory. Yanof-
sky begins with finite sets and cardinalities, and introduces counterintuitive
properties of infinite sets via Hilbert’s hotel. He shows that some infinite sets,
such as the rational numbers, are as large as the natural numbers, while others,
such as the real numbers, are larger than the natural numbers. Russell’s para-
dox prompts an axiomatization of set theory via the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms.
Finally, topics such as the independence of the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms from
the continuum hypothesis and from the axiom of choice are explored.
The learning curve in this chapter is quite steep for an uninitiated reader;
however, this is due to the subject matter. Yanofsky succeeds in presenting the
beginnings of set theory in an accessible manner. I have only minor quibbles.
First, the Zermelo-Fraenkel axioms are stated without further elaboration; some
remarks as to their significance would have been nice. Second, the importance,
and impact, of Russell’s paradox should be stressed more.
Chapter 5 deals with computational complexity, limitations on the usefulness
of algorithms due to efficiency. We are first introduced to some examples of easy
problems that can be solved in a reasonable, polynomially bounded amount of
time, such as addition and multiplication, and Euler’s solution to the Königs-
berg bridges problem. We then turn to hard problems, such as the Traveling
Salesman, Hamiltonian cycles, and satisfiability of propositional formulas. The
amount of time it takes to solve these problems can grow exponentially in the
size of input – these are NP problems. Yanofsky explains how NP problems
are related via reduction, mentions the Cook-Levin theorem and the famous
P = NP problem. Finally, he briefly discusses approximation algorithms and
problems that are even harder than NP.
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This chapter is a good exposition of the basic ideas of computational com-
plexity. I liked the idea of covering computational complexity before the more
principled limitations of computability. Even though the limitations are prac-
tical, they are very real and deserve the philosopher’s attention; the interested
reader could turn to an excellent essay by Scott Aaronson (2013) on why philoso-
phers should care about computational complexity. At times, I would have liked
to be given more explanation as to why some problems that superficially look
alike, such as Euler cycles and Hamiltonian cycles, can nevertheless fall in dif-
ferent complexity classes.
Chapter 6 covers the limitations of computability. Yanofsky first introduces
basic notions such as algorithms and programs. The most important algorithmi-
cally undecidable problem is the Halting Problem: Does an algorithm terminate
on a certain input or not? Yanofsky proves its undecidability. We learn about
further undecidable problems. Rice’s theorem shows that no interesting prop-
erty of an algorithm is decidable. Some problems are not solvable even if we are
given an oracle that solves the Halting Problem. Finally, Yanofsky briefly dis-
cusses the ramifications of (un-)computability for the human mind, mentioning
the works of Kurt Gödel, Roger Penrose, and Douglas R. Hofstadter.
The exposition in this chapter is, again, accessible; Yanofsky conveys a feel
for computability and its limitations. At times, he covers the ground too fast.
For example, the correspondence between programs and numbers, or Rice’s
theorem, could have been explained in more depth. Finally, the discussion of
computers and minds is too brief to be satisfactory. Many philosophers are
skeptical as to the ramifications of these results for the human mind, and some
critical voices should have been mentioned.
Chapter 7 discusses limitations of science in three sections. In the first sec-
tion, on limitations of predictability, Yanofsky distinguishes predictability and
determinism, and emphasizes the importance of the former notion in science.
There are three kinds of limitations. First, in chaotic systems, such as the
Lorentz system, the temporal evolution depends sensibly on initial conditions.
Second, some systems do not have a simple description in terms of elemen-
tary mathematical operations; the three-body problem is an example. Finally,
for some many-particle systems, a statistical description is more feasible than
precise bookkeeping.
The second section introduces counterintuitive features of QuantumMechan-
ics (QM), which are traced back to the so-called “Wholeness Postulate”: “[t]he
outcome of an experiment depends on the whole setup of the experiment” (p.
176). We are initiated in results such as the Kochen-Specker theorem, non-
locality as demonstrated by Bell’s theorem, and quantum eraser experiments.
Yanofsky also discusses four interpretations of QM: The Copenhagen interpre-
tation, the Multiverse (many-worlds) interpretation, the Hidden Variables (de
Broglie-Bohm) interpretation, and Quantum Logic.
The third section discusses aspects of relativity theory. According to Yanof-
sky, “[t]he central idea of relativity theory is that properties of the physical
universe depend on how they are measured.” (p. 214) Special Relativity is in-
troduced via two postulates: First, “observers at constant speed must observe
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the same laws of motion” (p. 216); second, “observers will always view the speed
of light at the same rate” (p. 219). Consequences of these postulates are length
contraction, time dilation, relativity of simultaneity, and the equivalence of mass
and energy. General Relativity is introduced via the elevator thought experi-
ment; features such as the curvature of space-time and the bending of light are
mentioned. The chapter closes with an outlook on the problem of reconciling
General Relativity and QM.
I found the sections on QM and relativity disappointing. There are, first,
some inaccuracies. Here are some examples – the expert will find more. Quan-
tum superpositions are described as follows: “Usually an object has a position
[...] [t]he phenomenon of being in more than one place at one time is called su-
perposition” (p. 178, emphasis in original). However, superposition is not tied
to the position of particles – rather, superposition means that if a system can
be in two states, then a third state, which is a combination – superposition – of
the first two, is also a possible state. The characterizations of the measurement
problem, and of QM as indeterministic (for the most part), are also problematic.
Turning to relativity, the “central idea” of relativity, quoted above, can be seen
to be false by confronting it with the second postulate. Finally, claims such
as “[a]ll is relative” (p. 221) are not warranted by relativity theory. Yanofsky
should have abstained from this kind of rhetoric, as he distances himself from
a “New Age” orientation in the introduction of the book. The discussion is also
disappointing from a philosophical point of view: Most of the work on the foun-
dations of physics of the last twenty years or so has been disregarded, and taking
it into account might have led to a more nuanced discussion of consciousness,
free will, or the possibility of an observer-independent reality.
Chapter 8, on “Metascientific Perplexities”, deals with issues from philoso-
phy of science, the applicability of mathematics, and Anthropic Principles in
three sections. The first section is about some classical problems of philoso-
phy of science, such as the problem of induction, Hempel’s paradox, the role of
theoretical considerations in theory choice, Karl Popper’s idea of falsifiability,
Thomas Kuhn’s theory of theory change, and the question whether we have
reached the end of science.
In the second section, Yanofsky discusses “Wigner’s puzzle”, the “unreason-
able effectiveness of mathematics”: how can mathematics be so useful in sci-
ence, even though it has a high degree of autonomy from science? Yanofsky
goes through several purported examples from the history of science, and dis-
cusses solutions. He observes that, firstly, mathematics is not applied in many
branches of science outside of physics, and many branches of mathematics never
get applied; secondly, many parts of mathematics are directly rooted in science.
He thinks that the combination of these two observations dissolves the problem.
Yanofsky turns to an even deeper set of puzzles in section three. First, why
does the universe exhibit structure and regularities at all? Second, why is our
universe such that life can exist? Third, why are there living creatures in the
universe that are capable of understanding the universe? One answer to these
questions is the so-called “Anthropic Principle”. It its weak form, the Anthropic
Principle says that the universe has to have properties that make it possible for
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us to observe it. Finally, Yanofsky discusses possible explanations of the weak
Anthropic Principle.
The short section on philosophy of science covers only a tiny fraction of
the field, and what is covered is not entirely even-handed, for example when
Yanofsky writes that Kuhn “felt that objective truth does not really exist” (p.
249). On the other hand, I liked the discussion of Wigner’s puzzle. The choice
of going through many examples of the unreasonable effectiveness is refreshing,
and the proposed dissolution of the puzzle quite convincing.
Chapter 9 deals with “Mathematical Obstructions”. First, we learn about
classes of numbers and their limitations: For example, the irrational numbers
cannot be written as a ratio of two whole numbers. Galois theory is discussed
as a tool to determine which polynomial equations can be solved. Then a con-
nection between mathematical problems, such as the Tiling Problem, and limi-
tations of computability – the Halting Problem – is established. The former are
reducible to the latter, and therefore unsolvable. Turning to logic, we are intro-
duced to Peano Arithmetic, symbolization, the arithmetization of syntax, and
the “fixed-point machine”. With these ingredients, Yanofsky walks us through
logical paradoxes, such as Tarski’s Theorem and Gödel’s First Incompleteness
Theorem. Goodstein’s Theorem serves as an example of a “natural” theorem
that can only be proved using infinitary methods. Finally, Yanofsky discusses
Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem.
The exposition in this chapter is uneven. The introduction of the problems
is accessible, but Yanofsky should have tried to give us more insight into how
some of the results are established. The geometrical proof of the irrationality
of
√
2 is nice, but I found it harder to grasp than the usual algebraic proof.
Then, the discussion of the logical paradoxes, and Gödel’s First Incompleteness
Theorem in particular, proceeds too fast. For example, more explanation of
why and how we can write down a proof predicate would have been desirable.
The final chapter 10 offers a synthesis. Yanofsky presents a different typology
of the various limitations: physical, mental-construct (encompassing linguistic
and formal paradoxes), practical (such as from complexity), and of our intuition,
as in QM and relativity theory. Self-referential paradoxes are systematized in
a table. Yanofsky returns to the notion of reason, which he defines as “the set
of processes or methodologies that do not lead to contradictions or falsehoods”.
The book ends with personal observations.
All in all, Yanofsky’s project succeeds to a large degree. He has a gift for
presenting the technical issues in an accessible and light-hearted way; the book
should be accessible to readers who are not deterred by elementary mathematics.
The pleasure Yanofsky derives from mathematics, logic, and science is appar-
ent throughout the book and will capture the inclined reader. Some chapters
and sections, in particular on computer science and mathematics, are a plea-
sure to read. The subject matter demands an interdisciplinary approach, and
Yanofsky’s efforts to bring together results from different fields is fruitful.
The book also has its limitations. First, the selection of sciences discussed is
biased: Non-formal and non-fundamental sciences, such as biology, economics,
psychology, etc. are left out. Even if the limitations of these sciences were fun-
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damentally different from those of physics, it would have been interesting to hear
more on, say, limitations of social sciences due to the use of statistical methods,
or the limitations of neoclassical and behavioral approaches in economics.
Second, Yanofsky has a tendency to mention important qualifications of
general claims only briefly, or to relegate them to endnotes, while the main text
proceeds as if these qualifications could be ignored. For example, he informs us
that QM has a deterministic interpretation – Bohmian mechanics, – yet insists,
for the most part, on the indeterminism of QM. This omission will not satisfy
philosophers. It is legitimate for a popular account of science to ban technical
or minor issues from the main text, but here, it affected the quality of the book.
Third, Yanofsky’s classification of limitations, outlined in the first and last
chapter, is unsatisfactory. This is probably due to the fact that these field
diverge as to defy a unified treatment. Consequently, the book works well as a
collection of paradoxes and counterintuitive results, but it does not provide a
convincing, unified perspective on the limitations of science, mathematics, logic,
and philosophy.
In sum, some of the chapters, in particular on set theory, complexity, and
computability, may serve as useful introductions to these issues. As a whole,
the book is unsuitable for use in philosophy classes, because the philosophical
discussion lacks depth, and most of the philosophical progress of the last decades
is not taken into account. However, the book was not written for philosophers,
and I can recommend it as a popular account of the limitations of our knowledge.
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